#Actor vs observer bias series#

The problem Sinnott-Armstrong points out is that there is no way to determine which contrast class is the relevant class. In all cases, there is more the one possible contrast class. If one can eliminate all other members of the contrast class to which P belongs while not being able to rule out P, then one is justified in believing P. Hence, crucial to being justified in believing P is being able to eliminate members of a contrast class to which P belongs. On his view, in order to be justified in believing any proposition P, one must have a reason to believe that P rather than some other proposition. It’s worth pointing out that Sinnott-Armstrong is not an eliminativist about moral intuitions. And by our lights, this is something that simply cannot be done from the armchair. If we’re right, the burden is on the moral intuitionist to explain why we should have faith in our moral intuitions despite the gathering evidence concerning their seeming unreliability. It appears that in addition to being influenced by framing effects, our moral intuitions are also influenced by an actor–observer bias as well-a bias whereby we hold other people to different moral standards than we would hold ourselves even if we were in the same situation. Finally, we present the results of a new study which create yet another hurdle intuitionists must clear if they want to motivate their view.

Then we examine some of the literature on framing effects-especially as it pertains to moral philosophy. Along the way, we first provide an overview of what Sinnott-Armstrong calls the Master Argument against intuitionism. In this paper, we are going to try to add more fuel to the empirical fire that Sinnott-Armstrong has placed under the feet of the intuitionist. More specifically, he has suggested that insofar as our moral intuitions are subject to what psychologists call framing effects, this poses a real problem for moral intuitionism.

#Actor vs observer bias series#

In a series of recent papers, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has used findings in social psychology to put pressure on the claim that our moral beliefs can be non-inferentially justified.